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Abstract 
This paper conceptualizes the European Union (EU) as a system of differentiated integration 
characterized by both variation in levels of centralization (vertical differentiation) and 
variation in territorial extension (horizontal differentiation) across policy areas. Differentiation 
has been a concomitant of deepening and widening and has increased and consolidated as 
the EU’s powers, policy scope, and membership have grown. Turning to explanation, the 
paper attributes the pattern of differentiated integration in the EU to the interaction of 
interdependence and politicization. Differentiation among the member states (internal 
differentiation) results from supranational integration under conditions of high 
interdependence and politicization. By contrast, external differentiation (the selective policy 
integration of non-member states) occurs in highly interdependent but weakly politicized 
policy areas. These constellations are illustrated in case studies of differentiation in the 
internal market, monetary union, and defence. 
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I.  Introduction 
‘What is the EU?’ and ‘How does it develop?’ are the perennial questions driving the study of 
European integration. In order to answer these questions, the theory and research of European 
integration has predominantly focused on the expansion of the EU’s tasks, competencies, and 
membership. The big debates in European integration theory between different versions of 
neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism have focused empirically on big ‘deepening’ 
decisions such as the establishment of the European Communities (e.g. Haas 1958; Milward 
1984), the Single Market, or Economic and Monetary Union (e.g. Moravcsik 1998; Sandholtz 
1993; Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). More recently, ideational approaches have been applied to 
the same turning points (Parsons 2003) as well as to EU enlargement (Schimmelfennig 2003). 
In all of these studies, the issue has been why and under what conditions the EU deepens or 
widens and what this tells us about its nature. In this context, instances of differentiation such as 
the opt-outs from EMU, the transitional arrangements for new member states, or the association 
of non-member countries were mainly seen as (temporary or marginal) side effects of 
negotiations on bargaining about ‘more integration’. 
In this paper, we take a different perspective. We propose to conceptualize the EU and explain 
its development as a ‘system of differentiated integration’ (see Leuffen et al. 2013). Rather than 
restricting differentiation to a temporary, accidental, or non-systematic feature of European 
integration, we argue that differentiation is an essential and, most likely, enduring characteristic 
of the EU. Moreover, differentiation has been a concomitant of deepening and widening, gaining 
in importance as the EU’s tasks, competencies, and membership have grown. We distinguish 
two types of differentiation that we term vertical and horizontal differentiation. Vertical 
differentiation means that policy areas have been integrated at different speeds and reached 
different levels of centralization over time. Horizontal differentiation relates to the territorial 
dimension and refers to the fact that many integrated policies are neither uniformly nor 
exclusively valid in the EU’s member states. Whereas many member states do not participate in 
all EU policies (internal horizontal differentiation), some non-members participate in selected EU 
policies (external horizontal differentiation).  
From this conceptual starting point we turn to explanatory theory. Two main factors of 
integration are distilled from classic theories of European integration: interdependence and 
politicization. Whereas interdependence is a driver of integration, politicization acts as an 
obstacle. We develop conjectures on how different constellations of interdependence and 
politicization generate vertical and horizontal differentiation in the EU’s system of differentiated 
integration. In a nutshell, we argue that vertical differentiation mainly results from variation in 
interdependence whereas horizontal differentiation is triggered by politicization. Internal 
differentiation – EU member states opting-out – is produced by supranational integration under 
conditions of high policy interdependence and asymmetric politicization across member states. 
External differentiation results if non-members that are unable to join because EU membership 
I H S — Schimmelfennig et al. / The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration — 7 
is highly politicized opt-in selectively in highly interdependent but weakly politicized policy areas. 
We illustrate our theory in three brief case studies on the internal market, monetary union, and 
EU defence policy.  
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II.  Differentiated integration in the EU 
II.1  A system of differentiated integration 
Polities can be conceptualized as three-dimensional configurations of authority (Leuffen et al. 
2013: 8-9). 
• Level of centralization. Polities that monopolize authoritative decisions in the centre 
have a maximum level of centralization, whereas decision-making authority dispersed 
across a multitude of actors indicate a low level of centralization. 
• Functional scope varies between authority over a single issue and authority over the 
entire range of policies. 
• Territorial extension. The authority of a polity can be limited geographically to a single 
political territory, or it may encompass several territories – up to the entire world.  
The classical configurations are the (unitary) state and the international organization. In the 
unitary state, all policies are made at the same (central) level and cover the same (limited) 
territory. In addition, the state traditionally has maximum functional scope: it covers all policy-
areas. By contrast, international organizations are typically decentralized and task-specific but 
cover a large number of territories.  
Federal states differ from the unitary state in that policy areas are governed at different levels of 
centralization or co-governed by subnational and national authorities. The territorial extension 
and functional scope of the federal state, however, is of the same order as that of unitary states. 
It deals with all policy areas inside a closed territory (note, however, that a federation’s 
extension grows with the number of subunits of which it is composed). This is also the basic 
model of federalist conceptions of European integration, which assume a set of member states 
that form a Union and allocate the authority over policy sectors to themselves, to the Union or, 
as mixed competences.  
In contrast to the federalist conception, both the level of centralization and the territorial 
extension may vary by policy or task. The EU has different boundaries and members for the 
Eurozone, Schengenland, or the Single Market. At the same time, the EU differs from the 
conglomerate of functionally specialized and partly overlapping but formally independent 
international organizations that characterizes the international system and is captured in 
alternative visions for ‘competitive governments for Europe’ (Frey and Eichenberger 1996) or a 
‘condominio’ of ‘many Europes’ (Schmitter 1996: 136). Such conceptions ignore the extent to 
which the EU has developed an institutional core or centre that reaches across the EU’s policy 
sectors with their variation in centralization and territorial scope. This institutional core is 
constituted, first, by the Treaty on European Union; second, by the EU’s institutions, namely the 
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European Council, which gives general directions for all policy sectors of the EU and for treaty 
revisions, but also by the Council, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the 
European Court of Justice, which are present – albeit to different degrees and with varying 
competences – across the board of EU activities and across the territories into which the EU’s 
external relations reach. Finally, there is a core group of member states – the original EC-6 and 
most members of the Eurozone – that take part in all the activities of the EU at the highest level 
of centralization. The EU is not ‘many Europes’ with task-specific jurisdictions each having their 
own organization but one Europe with a single organizational and member state core and a 
territorial extension that varies by function. This is how we define a ‘system of differentiated 
integration’.
1
  
Systems of differentiated integration are characterized by vertical and horizontal differentiation. 
In determining differentiation, we start from a ‘policy’ as a set of rules and procedures governing 
an issue or issue-area. Each policy has a certain level of centralization (or vertical integration) 
and territorial extension (or horizontal integration). The variance in vertical integration across 
policies constitutes the degree of vertical differentiation in the system. In addition, we can 
determine the horizontal integration in each policy area by counting the number of participating 
states. The variance in horizontal integration across policies constitutes the extent of horizontal 
differentiation in the system. A system in which either vertical differentiation or horizontal 
differentiation (or both) are zero ceases to be a system of differentiated integration. 
In addition to the extent of horizontal differentiation, we can distinguish different kinds of 
horizontal differentiation in the EU. There is no horizontal differentiation in a policy area if there 
is uniform and exclusive membership of EU member states. This is the case, for instance, in the 
Common Agricultural Policy. A policy area is characterized by internal differentiation if at least 
one member state does not participate in integration - monetary policy is the most prominent 
case in point – and by external differentiation if at least one non-member state participates: this 
is true for the internal market, which extends into the European Economic Area (with Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway). In addition, internal and external differentiation can go together as 
in the policies covered by ‘Schengen’, which combines the membership of EU non-members 
(such as Norway and Switzerland) and the non-membership of EU members (such as Ireland 
and the UK). 
 
                                                     
1
 This conceptualization overlaps with characterizations of the EU as an ‘empire’ (e.g. Beck and Grande 2007; Marks 
2012; Zielonka 2006) in so far as graded membership is a common feature of empires. Our concept of ‘system of 
differentiated integration’ is more limited, however, in that it does not imply any assumptions about the nature of the 
relationship between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’. We also try to avoid the value-laden connotations of the term ‘empire’. 
Finally, we should stress that our use of the term ‘system’ is formal and does not imply any commitment to systems 
theory. 
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II.2  Measuring and mapping differentiated integration 
Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold (1970) were the first to systematically categorize and map 
European integration with the help of two indicators: extension (functional scope in our 
terminology) and intensity (level of centralization). Tanja Börzel (2005) provides a more fine-
grained and robust measurement (of what she calls breadth and depth), which explicitly builds 
on the work by Lindberg and Scheingold but extracts its information exclusively from formal 
decision rules as spelled out in the treaties. In our mapping of integration, we both simplify and 
expand Börzel’s measurement. First, we collapse breadth and depth into a single measurement 
for vertical integration and extend it to 2013.
2
 Following Börzel, our variable is ordinal and 
consists of six categories detailed in Table 1. Note that our data reflects treaty-based 
differentiation and hence excludes differentiation that is based on EU secondary legislation. 
Second, we extend the measurement to horizontal integration by counting the number of states 
that formally participate at the highest level of integration in a particular policy area. We then 
divide that number by the total number of European states existing at that time.
3
   
Table 1: Measurement of vertical integration 
 Vertical integration 
0 No EU-level policy coordination 
1 Intergovernmental coordination (no delegation, no pooling) 
2 Intergovernmental cooperation (minimal delegation, no pooling) 
3 Joint decision-making I (‘Community method’, but limited pooling) 
4 Joint decision-making II (‘Community Method’, pooling) 
5 Supranational centralization (full delegation to supranational bodies) 
(Source: Börzel (2005: 221)) 
 
 
 
                                                     
2
 There is scope for simplification because breadth and depth are neither conceptually nor empirically independent. Both 
dimensions have a common origin because having EU-level policy coordination with ‘exclusive national competencies’ 
is impossible. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of supranational centralization without exclusive EU competencies. 
Empirically, we also find that levels of breadth are highly correlated with levels of depth. 
3
 For the list of European states entering the measurement, see Leuffen et al. (2013: 16). We added Kosovo since 2008. 
Note that we count the number of countries participating at the highest level of integration in the policy regardless of 
whether they are member states or not. For instance, for monetary policy, we only count countries that are member of 
the Eurozone, not those participating in the ERM. For economic freedoms, we include the three countries of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) that are also member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). 
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Figure 1: Vertical integration, horizontal integration, and horizontal differentiation in the EU  
(Annual mean policy scores of 18 policy areas, 1956-2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Börzel (2005: 221) for vertical integration; own data) 
Figure 1 displays the development of vertical and horizontal integration measured as the mean 
of 18 policy area scores (as defined in Börzel 2005) and standardized to range between 0 and 
1.  Two trends can be discerned. First, European integration is a story of growth in integration. 
There are periods of accelerated growth (the 1950s and the 1990s) and periods of relative 
stagnation (the 1970s and 2000s) but no rollback. By 2013, the average value for vertical 
integration has risen to a level of almost 80 percent (or 4 on the vertical integration scale). The 
strong QMV-based version of the ‘Community method’ is now the typical decision-making mode. 
Similarly, the line for horizontal integration indicates that, on average, 75 percent of European 
countries now partake in the EU’s integrated policies. 
Second, it is remarkable that the lines for vertical and horizontal integration show roughly the 
same trajectory and have reached roughly the same level of integration. They indicate that the 
alleged dilemma between deepening vs. widening does not exist. It appears as if vertical 
integration has attracted ever more European countries to the EU and/or that enlargement has 
produced renewed interest in deepening. At least, vertical and horizontal integration do not 
stand in each other’s way. 
Figure 1 also shows that the dynamic growth in integration has been accompanied by an 
equally dynamic growth in horizontal differentiation since the 1990s. Horizontal differentiation is 
measured as the share of differentiated policy areas.
4
  Until the late 1980s, integration in the 
                                                     
4
 We take the same 18 policy areas and include internal and external differentiation. We disregard individual exemptions 
from rules of the policy area (such as transitional arrangements for new member countries) as long as countries 
participate in the policy in general. 
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European Community (EC) has remained uniform. With the exception of transitional provisions 
for new member states and a few individual exemptions, member states have always 
participated in, and non-member states have been excluded from, every integrated policy. The 
1990s, however, have seen a surge in both internal and external differentiation. Since the mid-
1990s, more than half of the policy areas in our sample have been horizontally differentiated in 
one way or another. Figure 1 suggests that horizontal differentiation has been the facilitator – or 
the price – of dynamic growth in both vertical and horizontal integration.   
Figure 2 presents two additional measures of differentiation. For both vertical and horizontal 
integration, it presents the standard deviation across the 18 policy areas and their range, i.e. the 
distance between the policies with maximum and minimum integration. The figure shows, first, 
that vertical differentiation has always been more pronounced than horizontal differentiation – 
both the standard deviation and range values are higher. In other words, the differences in 
centralization across policy areas exceed the differences in membership.  
Figure 2: Vertical and horizontal differentiation in the EU, 1956-2013 (standard deviations and 
range values) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second, vertical differentiation has remained a stable concomitant of European integration 
throughout its history. In spite of strong overall vertical integration, the differences in 
centralization across policies have remained almost constant. The range spread between the 
most and the least centralized policy has fluctuated between 60 and 80 percentage points (or 3 
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to 4 points on the five-point vertical integration scale) and is currently exemplified by the 
difference in vertical integration between defence and monetary policy.  
Third, horizontal differentiation has set in later, has fluctuated more strongly and has 
significantly increased over time. In line with Figure 1, horizontal differentiation, i.e. the opt-out 
or exclusion of member states from integrated policies, and the participation of non-member 
states, have only started in the late 1980s. Horizontal differentiation has reached a first peak in 
the mid-1990s, marking the difference between an internal market expanded to the EFTA 
countries (the EEA countries and the new members of 1995) and a European Monetary System 
that had shrunk as a result of the monetary turbulences of the early 1990s. A similar 
discrepancy occurred in the mid-2000s when Eastern enlargement increased the European 
Research Area to 31 members whereas the Euro zone remained limited to 13 member states.  
In sum, whereas vertical differentiation has always exceeded horizontal differentiation in 
European integration but has remained more or less stable, horizontal differentiation has grown 
over the past 30 years. In other words, the data show that the EC of the 1950s to the late 1980s 
was a highly decentralized but uniform federal polity; by contrast, the EU has developed into a 
system of differentiated integration combining vertical with horizontal differentiation. Moreover, 
the strong growth in both vertical and horizontal integration has not reduced either vertical or 
horizontal differentiation. The patterns and trends in the data on integration suggest that 
differentiation is a durable feature of European integration and maybe even growing in 
importance. To better understand these patterns and trends, we now move on to theorizing their 
main driving forces. 
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III. Explaining differentiated integration: interdependence and 
politicization 
A system of differentiated integration is a polity that displays variance across policy areas and 
across space, while maintaining an institutional core. We suggest that the emergence, 
configuration, and development of the EU’s system of differentiated integration can best be 
understood by focusing on properties of its constitutive components: policies and countries. We 
further suggest that two variables constitute a promising starting point for a parsimonious 
explanation of differentiated integration: interdependence and politicization. Whereas 
interdependence can generally be conceived as a factor that creates demand for and promotes 
integration, politicization tends to inhibit integration. Where high levels of interdependence and 
politicization come together, differentiated integration is likely to result. 
Interdependence is considered a main driving factor of integration in both major integration 
theories: (liberal) intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik 1998) and in neofunctionalism or 
supranationalism (e.g. Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1997). Intergovernmentalists argue that 
governments, when realizing that unilateral policy options do not produce desired results, 
engage in multilateral cooperation to obtain economic and security benefits they could not 
achieve otherwise. If there are negative externalities entailed in policies conducted by other 
states, domestic constituencies (such as interest groups) alert their governments to such 
problems and incite them to provide a joint policy response, e.g. policy harmonization or 
integration. According to supranationalism, transnational exchanges and transactions are a 
major driving force of integration, generating demand for international rules. To the extent that 
transnational exchanges are both a cause and a manifestation of international interdependence, 
the two factors can be equated with each other. This is most obvious in the case of transnational 
economic exchanges, which result from the welfare benefits that countries expect to derive from 
foreign trade and investment.  
Interdependence varies across policies, countries, and time. Certain policies entail stronger 
externalities or transnational exchanges than others, and countries can be affected differentially 
by interdependence. Moreover, supranationalism assumes European integration to produce 
endogenous interdependence or ‘spillovers’: initial steps of integration bring about additional 
transnational exchange and externalities for additional policy areas and countries. These 
spillovers result in demand for additional integration. 
While interdependence is seen as a driver of integration, most integration theories agree that 
politicization tends to be an impediment to integration. We follow De Wilde’s (2011: 560) 
definition of politicization of European integration ‘as an increase in polarization of opinions, 
interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of 
policy formulation within the EU.’ Mass-level salience and contestation of European integration, 
the mobilization of Euro-sceptic public opinion by Euro-sceptic parties, and opportunities to 
I H S — Schimmelfennig et al. / The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration — 15 
voice Euro-sceptic opinions in national referendums or elections to the European Parliament are 
the main indicators of politicization in the EU. In the first decades of European integration, major 
integration steps were argued to have been taken under the condition of a ‘permissive 
consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Since the Treaty of Maastricht, however, the 
politicization of European integration has increased markedly (cf. Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; 
Marks and Steenbergen 2004), reached new heights with the ratification process of the 
Constitutional treaty (cf. Statham and Trenz 2013), and given rise to a new cleavage in 
European politics (Kriesi et al. 2008). Hooghe and Marks (2009) argue that politicization leads to 
a stronger awareness of EU affairs, i.e. more people care about integration outcomes. Since 
elites are generally considered more supportive of the integration process than publics, a more 
mobilized citizenry engenders growing opposition to the integration project. While elites are 
most concerned about the autonomy costs of integration (Mattli 1999), identity concerns and 
costs come into play at the level of citizens – a dynamic most prominently covered by 
constructivist theories of European integration.  
Similar to the issue of interdependence, politicization differs across policy areas and countries. 
As Hoffmann (1966) pointed out, the prospect of integration in areas of ‘high politics’ should 
yield higher autonomy costs compared to integration in ‘low politics’. Taking Hoffmann’s 
distinction as a point of departure, Jachtenfuchs and Genschel (2014) distinguish ‘core’ and 
‘non-core state powers’ and point to the assumption that states attach more importance to 
issues that relate to ‘core state powers’ and that are closely linked to questions of national 
sovereignty (such a state’s army, currency, or public administration). Concerning country 
differences we expect that European integration should be particularly contested in countries 
with a comparatively high share of citizens with exclusive national identities (cf. Hooghe and 
Marks 2005; 2009).  
We submit that the interaction of interdependence and politicization explains the general pattern 
of integration and differentiation in the EU. We conceive interdependence as the primary driver 
of integration. Interdependence creates the initial demand for integration, and a subsequent 
increase in exogenous or endogenous interdependence produces demand for more integration. 
Whether this demand will be met, depends on politicization, however. In other words, 
politicization intervenes in the relationship between interdependence and integration. If 
interdependence is low, politicization does not matter much because there will not be major 
demand for substantial integration in the first place. If strong interdependence is combined with 
no or weak politicization, demand for integration is likely to be met. If strong interdependence is 
confronted with strong politicization, however, integration will fail, remain at a low level, or 
become differentiated. We can thus think of politicization as a factor that constrains 
governments in translating integration demand into integration outcomes. Moreover, we assume 
that institutional factors are of minor importance in shaping the translation of demand into 
outcomes compared with politicization. In other words, governments have ample freedom to 
design vertical and horizontal differentiation according to what fits the constellation of 
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interdependence and politicization best. The enormous variety of differentiated arrangements in 
European integration supports this assumption.  
We thus assume that policies are the more vertically integrated, the more they are characterized 
by interdependence and the less politicized they are.  As a corollary, vertical differentiation in the 
EU increases with the differences in interdependence and politicization across policies. We 
further assume that policies are the more horizontally integrated, the more countries are 
affected by interdependence and the less European integration is politicized in these countries. 
As a consequence, horizontal differentiation in the EU increases with differences in 
interdependence and politicization across countries. Asymmetric interdependence is, however, 
less relevant for horizontal differentiation than asymmetric politicization. According to Moravcsik 
(1998), asymmetric interdependence is a common feature of intergovernmental negotiations on 
European integration. It translates into differential bargaining power and affects the distribution 
of bargaining gains but does not normally prevent integration as long as all parties to the 
agreement win. By contrast, asymmetric politicization often has the effect that some 
governments face domestic ratification constraints or failures that prevent them from 
participating in the integrated policy. Moreover, when policy issues turn into identity issues or 
are confronted with principled concerns about sovereignty, they do not lend themselves to a 
bargaining solution.  
We therefore assume that three main factors condition the integration outcomes in each policy 
area: the extent of interdependence, the extent of politicization of the policy, and the asymmetry 
of politicization of European integration across countries. We further distinguish four typical 
outcomes at the policy level: (a) high vertical and uniform (or externally differentiated) horizontal 
integration, (b) high vertical and internally differentiated horizontal integration, (c) low vertical 
and uniform horizontal integration, and (d) low vertical and internally differentiated horizontal 
integration. Table 2 lists the configurations for dichotomous (weak and low) values of the three 
factors and the hypothesized outcomes.  Based on this table, we formulate a set of conjectures: 
Table 2: Policy characteristics and integration outcomes 
 Interdependence Politicization Asymmetry of 
politicization 
Integration Outcome 
1 High High High High & (internally) differentiated 
2 High High Low Low & uniform 
3 High Low --- High & internally uniform (or externally 
differentiated) 
4 Low High High Low & (internally) differentiated 
5 Low High Low Low & uniform 
6 Low Low --- Low & uniform 
 
I H S — Schimmelfennig et al. / The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration — 17 
H1a: Low interdependence is a sufficient condition of low vertical integration. 
H1b: High interdependence is a necessary condition of high vertical integration. 
These two hypotheses follow from the assumption that integration is primarily driven by 
interdependence; high interdependence, however, does not necessarily translate into high 
vertical integration if politicization is high (and symmetric), too. 
H2: Given high interdependence, asymmetric politicization is a necessary and sufficient 
condition of internal horizontal differentiation. 
This is the core hypothesis about internal horizontal differentiation. The horizontally 
differentiated integration of a policy is driven by the asymmetric politicization of European 
integration across countries. If (high) politicization is symmetrical, we expect to see uniformly 
low vertical integration: all states are constrained by politicization and inhibited to move towards 
high levels of centralization.  
H3a: High vertical and internally uniform horizontal integration results from a combination of 
high interdependence and low politicization. 
H3b: High and horizontally differentiated integration results from a combination of high 
interdependence and high and asymmetric politicization. 
H3c: External horizontal differentiation results from a combination of high politicization of 
European integration in the non-member state but high interdependence and low politicization 
at the policy level. 
These hypotheses summarize the conditions under which high vertical integration is horizontally 
uniform or differentiated. Whereas high interdependence is necessary for high vertical 
integration, the form of horizontal integration is determined by the degree and distribution of 
politicization. If policy-specific politicization is high in all countries, vertical integration is likely to 
be low. If policy-specific politicization is low in all countries, we expect either uniform or 
externally differentiated horizontal integration. External differentiation results from a 
constellation between the EU and a third country, in which European integration in general is so 
highly politicized that membership is not domestically feasible but policy interdependence is so 
high (and policy-specific politicization is so low) that the third country seeks policy integration 
without membership. Finally, if policy-specific politicization is asymmetric across member states, 
we expect to see internally differentiated horizontal integration.  
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IV. Comparative analysis 
For an empirical plausibility check of these conjectures, we select three policies that vary 
strongly on the combination of interdependence and politicization. The ‘internal market’ is 
characterized by high interdependence and low politicization; ‘monetary union’ represents high 
interdependence and high politicization; and ‘defence’ is a policy of low interdependence (in the 
EU context) and high politicization. Note that we assume asymmetric politicization to be a 
constant (some countries are significantly more Eurosceptic than others) so that we cannot test 
variation on this condition. We also disregard potential cases of low interdependence and low 
politicization as theoretically uninteresting.  
For our illustrative comparative analysis and based on the hypotheses developed in the 
previous section, we use a simple, categorical measurement of the variables. The integration 
outcome is a combination of vertical integration and horizontal differentiation. For vertical 
integration, we use the scale shown in Table 1. ‘Low (or intergovernmental) integration’ 
comprises the first three steps from ‘no EU-level policy coordination’ to ‘intergovernmental 
cooperation’; ‘high (or supranational) integration’ merges ‘joint decision-making’ and 
‘supranational centralization’. ‘Uniform integration’ denotes a territorial extension that comprises 
all member states but only member states; a policy is ‘internally differentiated’ if at least one 
member state fails to participate at the highest level of vertical integration in the policy area; and 
it is ‘externally differentiated’ if at least one non-member state participates.  
The comparative categorical measurement of the conditions ‘interdependence’ and 
‘politicization’ is less straightforward and will be based on plausibility. Cases of ‘high 
interdependence’ are characterized by high transnational exchange, significant economies of 
scale, and/or important international externalities. For politicization, we start with the distinction 
between core state powers – ‘core functions of sovereign government’ (Genschel and 
Jachtenfuchs 2014: 1) or policies that have traditionally been a monopoly of public authorities – 
and non-core state powers. The integration of core state powers is assumed to create 
significant autonomy concerns for governments and identity concerns for nation-state citizens 
that translate into politicization. In addition, we take into account further indicators of 
politicization: Eurosceptic public opinion, protest activity, and referendums. These indicators 
capture variation across countries that the objective distinction between types of state powers 
cannot. 
Internal market: high interdependence, low politicization, supranational integration, and external 
differentiation 
The gradual establishment of a common market was the main project of European integration in 
its early stages starting with the Treaties of Rome (1957). A customs union has been in force 
since 1968 but significant non-tariff barriers to trade and restrictions on the movement of 
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services, capital, and persons remained in place. The principle of mutual recognition established 
by the European Court of Justice in its Cassis de Dijon decision of 1979 and the Single 
European Act (SEA, 1986) paved the way to a single market (officially in force since 1993). 
Internal market policies were the first policies to be centralized at a high level of vertical 
integration. Ever since the Treaties of Rome, they have been the bedrock of the Community 
method of joint decision-making, and the completion of the internal market was the reason the 
EC introduced qualified majority voting in the Council in the SEA. 
Internal market policies have always been uniformly valid in the member states – with the 
exception of temporary exceptions for new member states (such as limitations to the freedom of 
movement for labour in Eastern enlargement for up to seven years). Moreover, internal market 
policies are characterized by external differentiation. In 1994, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway 
joined the European Economic Area, an extension of the single market without a customs union 
but including the adoption of ‘horizontal’ and ‘flanking’ policies such as social policy, consumer 
protection, environmental policy, and research policy. The network of bilateral agreements 
between Switzerland and the EU creates an institutionally different but substantively similar 
horizontal integration into the internal market. 
Trade is the area of high transnational exchange par excellence. Market integration promises a 
more efficient factor allocation and economies of scale. These incentives create demand for 
negative integration, i.e. the removal of economic barriers. In addition, increasing levels of 
economic interdependence produce policy externalities, which in turn create demand for 
integration by regulation and supranational policy coordination (see Moravcsik 1991; Mattli 
1999; Mattli and Stone Sweet 2012). In addition, economic integration is typically an area of low 
autonomy and identity costs. It is a hallmark of the liberal democracies that the EU is composed 
of that the market is a largely autonomous sphere. The state regulates the market but state 
ownership of economic enterprises is very limited. By integrating the market supranationally, 
governments therefore lose relatively little autonomy. Moreover, markets do not qualify as strong 
symbols of national identity. Gradual market integration was the preferred initial policy area for 
European integration according to the community method precisely because it combined high 
interdependence with low politicization. 
These characteristics of internal market policies conform to constellation 3 in Table 2. They 
explain why we see high vertical integration and the absence of internal differentiation (H3a) but 
also external differentiation (H3c). Norway and Switzerland, the most important non-member 
countries participating in the internal market, are strongly dependent on trade with the EU. 
Roughly 75 per cent of Norway’s and two thirds of Switzerland’s external trade is with the EU. At 
the same time, identity-based popular Euro-scepticism is strong (Gstöhl 2002), and both 
countries have a history of negative referendums on EU membership (or even EEA 
membership, in the Swiss case). The highly politicized nature of EU membership in general 
prohibits accession to the EU; selective participation in a highly interdependent and weakly 
politicized policy area is possible, however.   
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Monetary union: high interdependence, high politicization, high integration, and internal 
differentiation 
In the European Economic Community, monetary policy has remained at the level of 
intergovernmental coordination. After the breakdown of the US-dollar-based Bretton Woods 
system of fixed exchange rates, the monetary policies of the member states were first 
coordinated in the unstable Currency Snake, then in the European Monetary System (EMS, 
since 1979). These systems were intergovernmental and remained outside the treaty 
framework. The leap towards high levels of vertical integration came with the establishment of 
the single currency in 1999, which vested the independent European Central Bank with 
exclusive monetary policy competences. 
Monetary policy has always been the most internally differentiated policy area of the EU. Only 
five member states participated continuously in the Snake and the EMS. The new member 
states of the 1980s took several years before they joined the EMS. The UK and the Nordic 
countries only participated for a short period between 1990 and 1992. Monetary policy was the 
first treaty-based EU policy from which member states – Denmark and the UK – were granted a 
full and formal opt-out, and it is the policy area with the most non-participants among the 
member states. The single currency started in 1999 with 11 out of 15 member states; in 2014, 
Eurozone membership stands at 18 out of 28. Apart from some micro states, non-member 
countries do not formally participate in the currency union (even though Kosovo and 
Montenegro have adopted the Euro unilaterally). 
Interdependence in monetary policy increased significantly with the internal market program. It 
promised to boost market transactions and transnational exchanges in Europe, thereby 
increasing the relevance of transaction costs of currency exchange for firms. In addition, the 
removal of barriers to the free movement of capital envisaged in the SEA threatened to increase 
the risk of currency speculation and undermine the stability achieved in the EMS (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1999: 3). A 1990 Commission report entitled ‘One market, one money’ argued that 
a single currency would add microeconomic efficiency and macroeconomic stability to the 
internal market: ‘complete capital liberalization requires virtually a unified monetary policy if 
exchange rates are to be stable’. 
In addition, however, monetary policy is a core state power. It has traditionally been a monopoly 
of the state and a symbol of national identity – as reflected in a quote of the Austrian economist 
Joseph Schumpeter: ‘The monetary system of a people reflects everything that the nation 
wants, does, suffers, is.’  The abolishment of the national currency generally increased public 
awareness of European integration and was a contested issue in many member states. In some 
of them, the Treaty of Maastricht and the adoption of the Euro were subject to referendums. As 
a result of negative referendums, Denmark secured an opt-out from EMU in the Treaty of 
Maastricht and Sweden stopped preparations for joining the Eurozone. The countries that opted 
out of the Euro de facto or de iure are not the ones that were least interdependent with the 
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internal market or least in line with the principles and rules of EU monetary policy but those with 
a strong national identity and a long track record of Euro-scepticism: Britain, Denmark, and 
Sweden. 
In sum, the case of monetary policy mirrors constellation 1 in Table 2. It corroborates H3b that 
internally differentiated integration results from high interdependence and asymmetric 
politicization. Under conditions of high international interdependence in the internal market, 
monetary policy’s status as a core state power was not sufficient to thwart supranational 
integration in this area altogether. High perceived autonomy and identity costs caused the most 
Euro-sceptic member states of the EU to opt out of the single currency, however. For the same 
reason, the Euro-sceptic non-members participating in the internal market have not made 
advances to join the currency union. 
Defence Policy: low interdependence, high politicization, low integration 
EU defence policy has not crossed the high integration threshold so far. After the failure of the 
supranational European Defence Community in 1954, there was no EU security policy 
coordination at all during the first decades of European integration. It became a formal part of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar of the EU at Maastricht (1992) but it was not until 
the St. Malo initiative of Britain and France in 1998 that concrete steps of putting a European 
defence policy into practice were taken. These steps have, however, not moved beyond a low 
level of vertical integration. Even though the policy was relabelled as Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP) in the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), it has remained in essence an 
intergovernmental policy based on consensual decision-making among member governments 
and voluntary participation of member states in CSDP operations.  
CSDP is characterized by only very modest internal differentiation. Denmark is the only member 
state to have demanded and been granted an opt-out in the area of security and defence as 
part of its opt-out package after the negative referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht. Denmark 
does not participate in the EU’s foreign and security policy when the relevant activities carry 
defence implications and Denmark does not participate in the European Defence Agency. More 
internal differentiation may result from ‘permanent structured cooperation’ among individual 
member states as envisaged in the Treaty of Lisbon. So far, however, this instrument has not 
been implemented. Finally, non-member states do not formally participate in CSDP: there is 
thus no external differentiation (even though non EU member states may participate selectively 
in and contribute to the EU’s civilian and military missions). 
European interdependence in the area of security and defence has remained relatively low. 
During the Cold War, Europeans have depended less on each other for achieving security and 
military effectiveness than on the United States. Transgovernmental exchanges have taken 
place in the context of NATO rather than in a European context. After the end of the Cold War, 
EU members have not faced any major military threat and European defence expenditures have 
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decreased sharply. For any residual threats and military operations, most EU member states 
continue to rely on NATO and US capabilities. Moreover, defence policy constitutes a core state 
power, as it has traditionally been a monopoly and raison d’être of the state. The integration of 
defence affects the core of state sovereignty and autonomy, qualities which tend to be 
particularly sensitive to questions of national identity. Even under conditions of high 
interdependence during the Cold War, it has always remained an intergovernmental policy. 
In spite of the Danish opt-out, internal differentiation in CSDP has been limited. Uniformity can 
be attributed to the low level of integration in this policy area. As long as decisions are generally 
taken by unanimity and member states participate voluntarily in CSDP operations, state 
sovereignty in defence policy is not critically undermined. Political salience and contestation and 
thus politicization would most probably increase, however, if defence policy competences were 
actually pooled in the EU and delegated to its supranational institutions. As a result, we would 
be likely to witness more opt-outs, not only by Euro-sceptic but also by traditionally neutral 
countries such as Ireland. The plan for ‘permanent structured cooperation’ in CSDP 
foreshadows such a development. In sum, the case of CSDP fits constellations 4 or 5 in Table 2. 
It corroborates hypothesis H1 that high interdependence is a necessary condition of high 
vertical integration and H2 that asymmetric politicization is a necessary condition of internal 
differentiation. 
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V. Conclusion 
The development of European integration is characterized by deepening, widening and 
differentiation. Whereas vertical differentiation across policies along the federalist model has 
always between a core feature of European integration, horizontal differentiation has emerged 
and increased since the early 1990s. The EU now appears to be a consolidated system of 
differentiated integration, a polity whose policies vary with regard to both their level of 
centralization and their territorial extension.  
We theorize the interaction of interdependence and politicization to be the main driving force of 
differentiated integration. Increasing interdependence creates demand for (more) integration. As 
long as integration is limited to non-core state powers or to integration-friendly countries, 
integration is likely to eschew politicization and remain uniform. This has been the general 
condition of European integration until the end of the 1980s. Politicization enters the stage as 
interdependence pressures increase, travel to other policy areas and countries, and start to 
affect core state powers and less integration-friendly countries. This is the situation post-1990. 
Member states with a relatively Euro-sceptic citizenry are likely to contest and reject the 
supranational integration of core state powers. This produces internal differentiation. Non-
member states whose strongly Euro-sceptic citizenry prevents them from joining the EU 
respond to high interdependence by selective integration in non-politicized policy areas such as 
the internal market. This produces external differentiation. 
Based on our analysis, differentiation is here to stay on the condition that exogenous and 
endogenous interdependence continue to grow. As the recent Euro crisis shows, both the 
politicization of integration and the pressures of interdependence are likely to persist. They 
deepen the divide between the Eurozone and the rest of the EU and spread into newly 
integrated neighbouring policies such as banking regulation (Schimmelfennig 2014). Moreover, 
EU policies continue to produce externalities for non-member countries that are either unwilling 
or unable to join. These externalities create a permanent demand for external differentiation. 
Against this backdrop, the study of differentiated integration can contribute to generating a more 
refined theoretical and empirical understanding of European integration more generally. 
24 — Schimmelfennig et al. / The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration — I H S  
 
VI. References 
Beck, Ulrich and Edgar Grande. 2007. Cosmopolitan Europe. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
De Wilde, Pieter. 2011. No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing the Politicization of 
European Integration. Journal of European Integration 33 (5): 559-575. 
Dyson, Kenneth, and Kevin Featherstone. 1999. The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Economic 
and Monetary Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Eichenberg, Richard C., and Russell J. Dalton. 1993. Europeans and the European Community: 
the dynamics of public support for European integration. International Organization 47 
(04): 507-534. 
Frey, Bruno S., and Reiner Eichenberger. 1996. FOCJ: Competitive Governments for Europe. 
International Review of Law and Economics (16): 315-327. 
Gstöhl, Sieglinde. 2002. Reluctant Europeans. Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland in the process 
of integration. Boulder: Rienner. 
Haas, Ernst B. 1958. The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Hoffmann, Stanley. 1966. Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State and the Future of 
Western Europe. Daedalus 95 (4): 861-898. 
Hooghe, Liesbet and Marks, Gary. 2005. Calculation, Community, and Cues. Public Opinion on 
European Integration. European Union Politics 6(4): 419-443. 
Hooghe, Liesbet, and Gary Marks. 2009. A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: 
From Permissive Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political 
Science 39 (1): 1-23. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus, and Philipp Genschel. 2014. 'Introduction: Beyond Market Regulation. 
Analyzing the European Integration of Core State Powers'. In Beyond the Regulatory 
Polity? The European Integration of Core State Powers, eds. Philipp Genschel and 
Markus Jachtenfuchs. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-23. 
Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, Timotheus 
Frey. 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.  
Leuffen, Dirk, Berthold Rittberger, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2013. Differentiated Integration. 
Explaining variation in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Lindberg, Leon N., and Stuart A. Scheingold. 1970. Europe's Would be Polity: Patterns of 
Change in the European Community. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Marks, Gary. 2012. “Europe and Its Empires: From Rome to the European Union”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies 50(1): 1-20. 
Marks, Gary, and Marco Steenbergen, eds. 2004. European Integration and Political Conflict. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
I H S — Schimmelfennig et al. / The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration — 25 
Mattli, Walter. 1999. The Logic of Regional Integration. Europe and Beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Mattli, Walter and Stone Sweet, Alec (2012). Regional Integration and the Evolution of the 
European Polity: On the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Journal of Common Market 
Studies. Journal of Common Market Studies 50(1): 1-17. 
Milward, Alan S. 1984. The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51. Berkeley University of 
California Press. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1991. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and 
Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. International Organization 45 (1): 
19-56. 
Moravcsik, Andrew. 1998. The Choice for Europe. Social Purpose and State Power from 
Messina to Maastricht. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
Parsons, Craig. 2003. A certain idea of Europe. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press. 
Rittberger, Berthold, Dirk Leuffen, and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2014. 'Differentiated Integration 
of Core State Powers.' In Beyond the Regulatory Polity? The European Integration of 
Core State Powers, eds. Philipp Genschel and Markus Jachtenfuchs. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Sandholtz, Wayne. 1993. Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht. International 
Organization 47 (1): 1-39. 
Sandholtz, Wayne, and John Zysman. 1989. 1992: Recasting the European Bargain. World 
Politics 42 (1): 95-128. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2003. The EU, NATO and the integration of Europe. Rules and rhetoric. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2014. 'The Euro Crisis and Differentiated Integration'. In Democratic 
Politics in a European Union Under Stress, eds. Sara Hobolt and Olaf Cramme. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (forthcoming). 
Schmitter, Philippe C. 1996. "Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New 
Concepts." In Governance in the European Union, eds. Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, 
Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck. London: Sage. 121-150. 
Statham, Paul, and Hans-Jörg Trenz. 2013. How European Union Politicization can Emerge 
through Contestation: The Constitution Case. JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 51 (5): 965-980. 
Stone Sweet, Alec, and Wayne Sandholtz. 1997. European integration and supranational 
governance. Journal of European Public Policy 4 (3): 297 - 317. 
Zielonka, Jan 2006. Europe as Empire. The Nature of the Enlarged European Union. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
 
 

  
  
 
Authors: Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger 
Title: The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: Interdependence, Politicization 
and Differentiation 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series 137 
 
Editor: Prof. Johannes Pollak, IHS 
Associate Editor: Sarah Christian, IHS 
 
ISSN: 1605-8003 
© 2014 Frank Schimmelfennig, Dirk Leuffen, Berthold Rittberger 
Published 2014 by the Department of Political Science, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna   +43 1 59991-0  Fax +43 1 59991-555  http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 
 ISSN: 1605-8003 
 
